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Resources are often limited, therefore it is essential how convincingly competitors present
their claims for them. Beside a player’s natural capacity, here overconfidence and bluffing
may also play a decisive role and influence how to share a restricted reward. While bluff
provides clear, but risky advantage, overconfidence, as a form of self-deception, could be
harmful to its user. Still, it is a long-standing puzzle why these potentially damaging biases
are maintained and evolving to a high level in the human society. Within the framework
of evolutionary game theory, we present a simple version of resource competition game in
which the coevolution of overconfidence and bluffing is fundamental, which is capable to
explain their prevalence in structured populations. Interestingly, bluffing seems apt to evolve
to higher level than corresponding overconfidence and in general the former is less resistant
to punishment than the latter. Moreover, topological feature of the social network plays an
intricate role in the spreading of overconfidence and bluffing. While the heterogeneity of
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interactions facilitates bluffing, it also increases efficiency of adequate punishment against
overconfident behavior. Furthermore, increasing the degree of homogeneous networks can
trigger similar effect. We also observed that having high real capability may accommodate
both bluffing ability and overconfidence simultaneously.
The emergence of overconfidence is a well-established bias in which a person’s subjective
confidence in self-assessment is greater than the objective accuracy of those judgments, especially
when confidence is relatively high 1. In human societies overconfidence has been recognized in
many different ways, such as overestimation of one’s actual performance, over-ranking of personal
achievement relative to others, and the excessive certainty regarding the accuracy of individual
beliefs 2. Although it is often blamed for hubris, market bubbles, financial collapses, policy fail-
ures and costly wars, overconfidence remains prevalent in our daily experience 3–5. Such a bias
can evolve due to the competition of alternative strategies and may contribute significantly to the
increase of morale, ambition, resolve and persistence 6–9. Very high levels of core self-evaluations,
a stable personality trait composed of locus of control, neuroticism, self-efficacy, and self-esteem,
may also be related to the overconfidence effect 10, 11.
As a concomitant bias, bluffing, also named boasting or exaggeration, is a representation
of something in an excessive manner 12, 13. The boaster is regarded as one who pretends to have
distinguished qualities, but has not at all or to a lesser degree 6, 12, 14. Usually bluffing is not reliably
distinguished from true ability 15 and exists in different forms, such as amplifying achievements,
deceiving others expectations by magnifying emotional expressions 12. It is important to stress that
2
the deception profile, including the appropriate levels of overconfidence and bluffing intensities,
plays a decisive role in determining what an individual gets in resource competitions. Our specific
interest here is to explore how such profiles develop due to an evolutionary process.
The application of realistic evolutionary rule, however, requires sanctioning of uncovered
bluffing, which represents a sort of social norm of the population. In fact, the ability to develop
and enforce social norms is probably one of the distinguishing features of the human species 16.
Several experiments and theoretical investigations have revealed that sanctions are able to create
a sufficiently strong selective pressure to prevent cheating, which is necessary to stabilize human
cooperation 17–23. Similarly, the deception behavior, regardless of self-deception (overconfidence)
or other-deception (bluffing), might be controlled by centralized sanctions. Although third-party
punishment can rectify peer biases caused by deception in cognition, system bias, which represents
an inclination of the whole group, is beyond its reach. This system bias can be brought by social
comparison bias 24, for instance, where most of the members in a group believe that they are better
(worse) than the average level of this group in certain aspects, which is apparently against the basic
mathematical principles 25, 26. Mandatory rules and many other factors can also bring about such
system bias 27.
Taking all the factors above into consideration, we explore how overconfidence and bluffing
evolve within the framework of a spatial resource competition model. Here we follow the suc-
cessful method of evolutionary game theory, which proved to be particularly efficient to explain
the emergence and maintenance of cooperation 28–40. We suppose that instead of strategies, players
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imitate personal profiles during the evolutionary process 41. More specifically, to adapt this concept
to the present model, overconfidence and bluffing, considered as peer biases, could be the subject
of imitation 14. The key element of the proposed model is both overconfidence and bluffing can
evolve simultaneously, which influence a player’s success to reach the desired resource. Further-
more, as another crucial point of our model, we suppose that uncovered bluffing will destroy the
reputation of the related player. Accordingly, the mentioned player’s overconfidence and bluffing
intensities fall onto the minimal levels that are available in the actual population.
By using this simple concept, we find that the general bluffing level always evolves to a
higher level than overconfidence. The application of sanctions, when the positive values of system
bias reveal more possible conflicts between competitors, lower the overconfidence and bluffing
levels remarkably. Beyond these observations we pay special attention onto the possible conse-
quence of interaction topology. It is well known that the spatial structure of interaction graph can
influence significantly the evolutionary outcome of competing strategies in social dilemmas 41–53.
Motivated by this fact, we test different representative topologies and explore their consequence
on the evolution of overconfidence and bluffing. We find that heterogeneity may boost bluffing and
facilitate punishment against individuals’ overconfidence, while increasing available neighbors of
each player on homogeneous networks has triggered similar effect.
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Results
We start by presenting the stationary overconfidence level fO and bluffing level fB as a function
of resource-to-cost ratio r/c, obtained on square lattice, as shown in Fig. 1(a). It suggests that
increasing r/c does not noticeably change fO, but decreases fB , especially when system bias
δ is relatively large. Lifting δ also significantly reduces overconfidence level fO for moderate
punishment probability p (p = 0.5). Note that positive values of δ induce extra conflicts, and
thus boost the chances of centralized sanctions. Therein it seems that the values of r/c have
little impact on the stabilization of overconfidence, regardless of whether punishment is rare or
frequent. Meanwhile, boast behavior (fB) slightly decreases as r/c increases. Importantly, the
results for regular random graph with k = 4 are in accordance with those for translation invariant
square lattice. Thus it seems that the structure of interactions does not play a prominent role as
long as the average degrees k are identical. The value of k, however, could play a decisive role
on the evolution of deception profile. To explore this effect, we investigate the impact of r/c on
fO and fB under extreme conditions (p = 1, δ = 1) on homogeneous networks with different k
values (k = 4; 8; 16). As shown in Fig. 1(b) overconfidence almost goes extinct irrespective of
the values of r/c and k, showing that enough sanctions can effectively reduce the general level of
overconfidence. Meanwhile, fB drops sharply to a minimum value as r/c ascends when k = 4, in
contrast to larger degrees as k = 8 or k = 16. In other words, having more available neighbors
partially offsets the effect of punishment on boasters.
We next evaluate the impact of probability of punishment p and system bias δ on general
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overconfidence level fO and bluffing level fB (see Fig. 2). Besides homogeneous networks, sum-
marized in Fig. 2(a) and (b), we also explored the possible impact of interaction heterogeneity by
considering BA scale-free networks, shown in Fig. 2(c). To avoid additional effects we used the
same average degree 〈k〉 = 4 used for random graph in Fig. 2(a). It can be observed that at any
given value of δ, increasing punishment rate p will slightly reduce both fO and fB . Meanwhile, for
any given p, both fO and fB drop with δ monotonously, signalling that δ plays a decisive role in
restraining the deception behaviours (both overconfidence and bluffing). This behaviour is based
on the fact that large δ ensures frequent conflicts between competing players, which will reveal
their real abilities. In the other extreme case, negative δ < 0 parameter values inhibits conflicts,
which results in a prompt fixation into a high overconfidence and high bluffing deception profile
(this case is not shown in figures). Moreover, another common trait of color maps independently of
the applied topologies is that fB always evolves to a higher level than the corresponding fO, high-
lighting that natural selection provides higher bluffing level than overconfidence when other factors
equal. Furthermore, the comparison of Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(c) illustrates that network heterogene-
ity can apparently elevate average bluffing intensity, fB . It also illustrates that the heterogeneity
of interaction topology helps to restrain overconfidence for relatively large δ values. Interestingly,
increasing k of homogeneous networks is capble to lift bluffing level fB while overconfidence fO
is slightly reduced (see also Fig. 1(b)).
For better understanding the possible influence of sanctioning mechanism on the evolution
of deception profile (α, β), we monitor the time evolution of α and β values on a square lattice
without and with punishment (shown in Fig. 3(a) and in Fig. 3(b), respectively). Fig. 3(a) shows
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how the probability distribution of f(α, β) pairs evolve in time in the absence of punishment,
when only imitation of deception profiles is possible. It can be observed that the small β values
die out first, signalling that boast is most favored by natural selection. Later, when only large
β values are present, those players become more successful who apply higher α values. As a
result, the whole population will be trapped into a large (α, β) pair after sufficiently long relaxation
(t = 100000 MC steps). In fact, once fixation occurs the evolutionary process stops. Here, fO and
fB can then be determined by means of averaging over the final states that emerge from different
initial conditions. As we conclude, a high α−high β combination survives when there exist only
imitations, which is in accordance with our previous observations 14. However, fixation never
happens when sanction determines the evolution (see Fig. 3(b)). In the early stage almost half of
the population is punished, hence low α−low β combinations will form the majority of f(α, β)
distribution. Later, as time passes, a dynamic balance emerges between lowα−low β combinations
and a moderate α−high β pairs. The specific position of the latter depend on the actual values of
δ and p parameters. In general, the punishment plays a “shunting” role here, undermining the
stabilization of overconfidence and bluffing in the whole population. Importantly, these results
hold for any homogenous networks besides square lattice. For strongly heterogeneous networks,
sometimes more than one α − β pair can survive around strong hubs even without punishment,
which is in agreement with related works where other player-specific profiles evolved 41, 48.
After realizing the significant impact of sanctions on the evolution of deception profile, next
we are interested in the targets of such punishments. More precisely, we wonder whether the real
inferiors’ deception profiles are minimized on homogeneous networks with different k values. For
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this reason we measure separately the average real capability of those players who are punished
and those players who are not. The ratio of their averages is denoted by Rability. Similarly, we
also measure the average payoff of the mentioned subclasses, and their ratio is denoted by Rpayoff .
These ratios are depicted in Fig. 4(a) for different random regular networks, where we gradually
increase the degree k. Apparently, Rability < 1 indicates that on average, players having lower real
γ abilities are punished more frequently. At the same time, Rpayoff < 1 values highlight that the
mentioned small-γ group benefit less than their higher ability opponents. Increasing the degree of
nodes, both Rability and Rpayoff raise unambiguously, showing that enhancement of connections
narrows the real capability- and payoff-gap between the punished players and those who are not
punished. In other words, punishment is directed principally towards who are really weak, but this
selective impact is gradually weakened as each one has more neighbors. Furthermore, for a deeper
insight, it is worth studying the influence of real capability on the evolution of overconfidence and
bluffing. Note that the real ability γ of each player remains unchanged during updating. We mark
by RO([a, b]) the ratio of the average overconfidence level of those individuals whose γ values are
in the [a, b] interval compared to the whole population. For simplicity, we divided the [0, γmax]
interval into 10 subclasses. Similarly, RB([a, b]) denotes the ratio of bluffing level for the same
subpopulation. Our results for k = 4 random regular graph are summarized in Fig. 4(b). The
plot suggests clearly that both RO and RB ascend with γ, and exceed the ratio 1 once γ > 0.5.
Note that homogeneous networks with other k values show similar tendency. Thus we conclude
that players with high ability are inclined to evolve to a higher state of both overconfidence and
bluffing because they have a higher chance to collect resource without conflict. Furthermore, if
8
conflict is inevitable and competitors should reveal their real abilities then the mentioned players
still have a higher chance to win.
Lastly, it is instructive to investigate the impact of upper limits αmax and γmax on the evo-
lution of fO and fB values. By keeping γmax = βmax = 1, αmax > 1 means that excessive
overconfidence intensity is allowed for competitors. γmax > 1, when αmax = βmax = 1, however,
implies that real abilities of players are significantly higher compared to the changing α or β values.
We note that βmax > 1 is not taken into consideration, for extravagant boasting could be easily rec-
ognized from real facts. For appropriate comparison, fO is normalized, fnormO = fO/αmax, when
αmax > 1 is applied. As demonstrated in Fig. 5(a), the possibility of sanctioning results in drastic
reductions in the normalized overconfidence level fnormO as αmax is increased. It suggests that pun-
ishment can effectively restrain excessive overconfidence, but is unable to decrease bluffing level
significantly. However, without punishment (p = 0), raising αmax gives rise to intensive conflicts
that help competitors to recognize others’ real capabilities. Therefore, fnormO and fB monotonously
decrease with αmax, and finally converge to 0.5, which equals to the initial value of average bluff-
ing intensities. We stress that the results presented in Fig. 5(a) are robust and remain valid if we use
other interaction topologies. Increasing γmax drives the evolution toward “neutral drift” because
peer biases, such as overconfidence and bluffing, become second-order important in resource com-
petitions when real abilities dominate. Importantly, however, fO and fB may fluctuate heavily in
heterogeneous networks, showing that the existence of strong hubs might influence significantly
the evolution both overconfidence and bluffing.
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Discussion
In summary, we have investigated how overconfidence and bluffing co-evolves within the frame-
work of a resource competition game. It is a well recognized fact that when confidence is relatively
high then the whole population fall victim easily into overconfidence, which is considered to be
the most “pervasive and potentially catastrophic” of all the cognitive biases by some psycholo-
gists 1, 10. Counterintuitively, this “erroneous” psychology can maximize individual fitness in many
situations, leading to its prosperity in human society. Meanwhile, the existence of bluffing behav-
ior, sometimes unable to be detected, usually leads to ambiguity in one’s perception about other’s
real ability. Our previous study highlighted that bluffing promotes overconfidence and they both
stabilize at a high level when evolution is limited via imitation without the chance to reveal com-
petitors’ real abilities 14. However, the ability to develop and enforce social norms is probably one
of the most characteristic feature of human species 16. Motivated by this fact we propose an evo-
lutionary which combines sanction mechanism with the clebrated rule of “imitating the better” 54.
Punishment here, instead of reducing individuals’ real income, is only reduced to their deception
behaviors, including both self-deception (overconfidence) and other-deception (bluffing). It is a
key point of our model that these two mechanisms, which may determine a player’s success, can
coevolve. Furthermore, except the deception profile, the system bias describing the group inclina-
tion towards extra conflicts is also considered. Accordingly, system bias can be treated as integral
effect, caused by all the other factors, to stimulate conflicts (δ > 0) or to inhibit conflicts (δ < 0)
between competitors. In addition, punishment is not certain to occur, but happens with probability
p here. Lastly, we stress that we have tested different interaction topologies to explore the possible
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consequences of structured population. All these details make our model more realistic.
Our extended model gives deeper insight to previous findings 14. As shown in Fig. 2, over-
confidence and bluffing have essentially the same changing tendency irrespective of p, δ and topo-
logical properties. It is in accordance with previous observation that bluffing promotes overcon-
fidence. There is, however, a significant difference, when both side of deception can coevolve.
Namely, boasting seems more stable than the fatal psychology of overconfidence because individ-
uals can take advantage of bluffing immediately. As a consequence, eliminating boast behavior
requires more intensive sanction mechanism to work. We also find that increasing heterogeneity
or average degree of the interaction networks significantly promote bluffing, and simultaneously
increase efficiency of adequate punishment (when p and δ are large) against overconfident behav-
ior. More importantly, this third-party punishment prominently limits overconfidence of excessive
intensity. Intriguingly, high capability of an elite might induce high level of his deception profile,
which lies in the fact that elites hardly fail in the conflicts.
In conclusion, for better understanding the intricate relation between overconfidence and
bluffing, we have proposed a more realistic model in which the individual deception profile coe-
volve. Overall, both social norms and topological properties of interaction networks have substan-
tial influence on the evolution of these “peer biases”. We hope that these observations will motivate
further research aimed at promoting our comprehension of the evolution of these “erroneous” but
sometimes meaningful inclinations.
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Methods
The traditional setup of an evolutionary game assumes N players occupying vertices of an interac-
tion graph. Our basic model is a resource competition game (RCG) in which neighbors compete
for resources and their success is based on how convincingly they claim for it. Without loss of gen-
erality, an individual i is characterized by a time-independent real capability γi ∈ [0, γmax], and an
evolving overconfidence intensity αi ∈ [0, αmax], and bluffing intensity βi ∈ [0, βmax]. Here γmax,
αmax, βmax values represent upper limits of corresponding properties of the whole population. Un-
less stated, γmax = αmax = βmax = 1. While the real capacity γi is fixed and unalienable feature
of each players, αi represents the actual overconfidence state (OS), a perception error about self-
ability. Similarly, βi characterizes the bluffing state (BS) of the player that helps to over-represent
abilities towards competitors. In particular, i believes he/she owns a “self-perceived capability” ki
as:
ki = γi + αi , (1)
while his/her “displaying capability” mi is observed as:
mi = γi + βi . (2)
Supposing a resource r is potentially available to neighboring individuals that claim it. If neither
of them claims then the resource remains unused. If only one individual makes a claim, then it
acquires the resource and gains fitness r while the other gains nothing. When, players i and j both
claim for this resource, a RCG takes place. In the latter case each individual pays a cost c due to
the conflict between them, and the one who has higher real capability acquires the resource. In this
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model, the recognition ability of each player is also influenced by a uniform system bias δ, which
allows us to control the intensity of conflicts between competitors. Summing up, a player i facing
with player j gains a payoff Pij that can be calculated as follows:
• (1) If ki > mj − δ and kj < mi − δ, player i claims but player j does not, thus Pij = r.
• (2) If ki < mj − δ, player i will not claim and remains empty handed, Pij = 0.
• (3) If ki > mj − δ and kj > mi − δ, a conflict emerges between players i and j when they
have to reveal their real capabilities which determine what they get: If γi > γj, Pij = r − c;
If γi < γj, Pij = −c.
Here parameter δ represents a uniform group inclination how to handle possible conflicts: for
positive δ > 0 values group members are motivated to “open their cards” impulsively and bravely,
and thus more conflicts take place. In case of δ < 0, however, conflicts are avoided because all
players in the group are excessively cautious.
Initially each player i is assigned by random γi, αi and βi values. The situation that two
values are equal is not taken into consideration. In stark contrast to our preliminary work 14 in the
extended model both αi and βi can coevolve, which influence dramatically a player’s success in
resource competition. During an elementary Monte Carlo (MC) step a randomly selected player
i collects its payoff Pi by playing RCG with all ki neighbors, where ki represents the degree of
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player i in the interaction graph. The total payoff of player i is
Pi =
∑
j∈Ω(i)
Pij , (3)
where Ω(i) represents all players in i’s neighborhood. Subsequently, a randomly chosen neighbor
j acquires its payoff Pj in a similar way.
As we noted, a crucial point of the evolution that players may change their deception profile
to collect more resources. In particular, if a player i looses a conflict against player j then his/her
extreme overconfidence and bluff levels are revealed, hence player i is punished with probability
p. As a result, the (αi; βi) values are reduced to the minimum levels of the whole population. Oth-
erwise, player i adopts the deception profile of a randomly selected neighbor j with the probability
W = W (Pj − Pi). And thus


ki > mj − δ, kj > mi − δ, γi < γj :


p : αi = εα, βi = εβ
1− p : W (Pj − Pi) =
(
1 + exp[(Pi − Pj)/K]
)
−1
Otherwise W (Pj − Pi) =
(
1 + exp[(Pi − Pj)/K]
)
−1
,
(4)
where εα and εβ represent the minimum overconfidence and bluffing intensity respectively. Pa-
rameter K characterizes the level of uncertainty in deception profile adoption 55. Without loss of
generality we use K = 0.1, but qualitatively similar results can be obtained for other K values.
Importantly, since the profile consists of two parameters, two independent random numbers are
drawn to enable uncorrelated imitation of αi and βi values, as it was suggested in Ref 48.
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The presented simulation results were obtained using different interaction graphs, such as
square lattice with periodic boundary conditions, regular random graph with different degrees,
and the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-free graph 56. The latter is served to explore the possible
consequence of heterogeneities. In accordance with the random sequential update, each full MC
step, which consists of N times of repeated elementary steps, gives a chance on average once to
update individual deception profiles.The typical system size contains N = 104−105 nodes and the
stationary frequencies are determined by averaging over 104 MC generations in the stationary state
after sufficiently long relaxation times. The stationary state is considered to be reached when the
average of the overconfidence level fO (the stable average values of α) and bluffing level fB (the
stable average values of β) no longer change in time. We have averaged the final outcome over 50
independent initial conditions.
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Figure 1 Stable overconfidence level fO and bluffing level fB as a function of resource-
to-cost ratio r/c for different values of p and δ on homogeneous networks as indicated in
the legends. Data presented in Panel (a) are obtained on square lattices with periodic
boundary conditions, while results depicted in Panel (b) are obtained on regular random
graphs with different values of degree (k = 4, 8, 16) when optimal punishment is applied
(p = 1, δ = 1). Other parameters: γmax = αmax = βmax = 1.
Figure 2 Color maps depicting the overconfidence level fO (left column) and the bluffing
level fB (right column) on the punishment probability (p) - system bias (δ) plane. Data
presented in Panel (a) are obtained on regular random graph with k = 4. Panel (b) are
obtained on regular random graph with k = 8, while results depicted in Panel (c) are
obtained on BA scale-free network with 〈k〉 = 4. Note that δ < 0 immediately leads to
fO → 1 and fB → 1 regardless of the applied topology (not shown). Other parameters:
r/c = 2.5, γmax = αmax = βmax = 1.
Figure 3 Time evolution of the α − β profile, as obtained on square lattices (a) without
punishment (p = 0) and (b) with punishment (p = 1). From top left to bottom right we have
presented the temporal distribution of (α, β) pairs at different MC steps, as indicated. The
comparison illustrates that punishment undermines the fixation of overconfidence and
bluffing. Other parameters: γmax = αmax = βmax = 1, (a) r/c = 3, δ = 0; (a) r/c = 3,
δ = 1.
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Figure 4 Some representative ratios plotted in histogram forms. Panel (a) depicts Rability
and Rpayoff ratios as a function of degree k on regular random networks. Here Rability
(Rpayoff ) represents the ratio of the average real capability (the average payoff) of those
individuals who are punished to those who are not punished. Panel (b) depicts RO and
RB as a function of real ability interval on regular random networks with k = 4. Here RO
denotes the ratio of the average overconfidence level of individuals whose real capability
fits in corresponding interval of fO. In a similar fashion, RB represents the ratio of the
average bluffing level of individuals whose real capability belong into the corresponding
interval of fB. Other parameters: p = 1, δ = 0.8, γmax = αmax = βmax = 1.
Figure 5 Stationary overconfidence level fO and bluffing level fB as a function of upper
limit of overconfidence intensity αmax (panel (a)) and in dependence of the upper limit
of real capability γmax (panel (b)). Panel (a) depicts the normalized overconfidence level
fnormO and bluffing level fB as a function of αmax without punishment (p = 0) and with
punishment (p = 0.3) on square lattices, where fnormO = fO/αmax. Panel (b) depicts fO
and fB as a function of γmax on square lattice and BA network when p = 0.9. Error bars
indicate the standard deviations, which are almost invisible in homogeneous network.
Other parameters: δ = 0.2, r/c = 2.
23
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
S
ta
bl
e 
fra
ct
io
n
r/c
 fO  fB   p=0.5, =0
 fO  fB   p=0.5, =0.2
 fO  fB   p=0.5, =0.6
(b)
 
 
S
ta
bl
e 
fra
ct
io
n
r/c
 fO  fB k=4
 fO  fB k=8
 fO  fB k=16
(a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Regular random graphy (k=4)      bluffing
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(c)
(b)
p
 
 p
(a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Regular random graphy (k=8)      bluffing
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Regular random graphy (k=4)   overconfidence
pp
Regular random graphy (k=8)   overconfidence
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pp
BA networks            bluffing
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
BA networks        overconfidence
0.000
0.1250
0.2500
0.3750
0.5000
0.6250
0.7500
0.8750
1.000
0.2
0.6
1
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.2
0.6
1
0.2
0.6
1
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.2
0.6
1
0.2
0.6
1
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.2
0.6
1
0.2
0.6
1
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.2
0.6
1
0.2
0.6
1
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.2
0.6
1
0.2
0.6
1
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.2
0.6
1
0.2
0.6
1
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.2
0.6
1
0.2
0.6
1
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.2
0.6
1
f( ) f( ) f( ) f( )
f( ) f( ) f( )
t=100000t=1000t=100
f( )
(a)
(b)
t=1
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0   Rability
  Rpayoff
 
 
ra
tio
degree
(a)
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
(b)
 
 
ra
tio
real ability
  RO
  RB
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 
 
 fnormO  fB  p=0,
 fnormO  fB p=0.3,
S
ta
bl
e 
fra
ct
io
n
max
(a)
 
 
S
ta
bl
e 
fra
ct
io
n
max
 fO fB  p=0.9,Lattice
 fO fB  p=0.9, BA
(b)
